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Abstract
We present a symbolic analysis of the ephemerizer’s protocol by Radia Perlman, using the CL-Atse tool
from the AVISPA’s tool-suite. This protocol allows transmitting a data that will “disappear” (i.e. cannot
be retrieved) after a certain time. We show that this protocol is secured for this property plus the secrecy of
the data, but is trivially non secured for it’s integrity. Therefore, we present two extensions of this protocol,
one natural and probably already done in practice, the other one much less obvious. We shows that while
the first extension guaranty the basic integrity property under certain conditions, the second one is much
stronger and even allows faster computations.
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1 Introduction
It is a difficult problem to ensure that a data is completely destroyed, say after a
given amount on time. Whatever it is transmitted by email, placed on a web server,
etc..., a data is expected to be copied or archived in a way that we cannot truly
control. To solve this problem, and to guaranty expiration times on certain mes-
sages, Radia Perlman proposed the so-called ephemerizer’s protocol [5], a solution
where a unique, not completely trusted server manage the keys used to encrypt
those messages. Since these keys are only known by the ephemerizer, deleting one
when it’s expiration time is reached makes the data “disappear”. It is the respon-
sibility of the ephemerizer to provide keys for the protocol and delete them at the
appropriate time. Moreover, Perlman’s protocol has the extra advantage to use a
so-called triple encryption, that guaranty the secrecy of the data even when the
ephemerizer is dishonest. However, it is kind of obvious that this protocol does not
guaranty the integrity of the data.
In this short paper, we present a series of formal analysis over the ephemerizer’s
protocol and some of it’s variants. These analyses were done using the CL-Atse tool
1 This paper is an extract of Charu’s work as student in Loria’s CASSIS team.
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[7], which is part of the AVISPA [6] European Project’s tool-suite, and that allows
automatic formal analysis of cryptographic protocols with the single (necessary)
restriction of a bounded number of sessions. These analyses are done on a symbolic
level, i.e. bit-strings are replaced by terms in a language of messages, and we
assume that all cryptographic primitives are perfect. See [4] for an overview of
formal methods used in protocol analysis. As usual in such cases, the protocol is
run in presence of an active intruder with all capacities of the Dolev-Yao intruder
[3] (i.e. he can intercept or block any message, impersonate agents, or use any legal
cryptographic operation).
Paper overview
First, we present the details of the version of the ephemerizer’s protocol that is
analyzed here (section 2), along with the security properties. A simple extension of
the protocol for data integrity is modeled. However, in section 3 we show that it
fails, and should never be used in practice. Instead, two extensions are proposed,
one quite natural and the other one less obvious. We show that while the natural
extension satisfy the basic data integrity property, the second one is much stronger
and may even be faster in practice. We conclude in section 4. Also, note that the
protocol models presented here are publicly available along with the tools, so that
anybody can check or extend the present work (see [1]).
2 The ephemerizer’s protocol
Notation
Here, the notations follow the ones from Radia Perlman, with small differences
due to our analysis tools. In particular, we note u.v the concatenation of messages
u and v; {M}K the encryption of M by K (symmetric or asymmetric depending
on K’s type); {M}inv(KAlice) the signature of M with Alice’s private key; and
HMAC (T,M) the MAC of M with key T .
Description
The ephemerizer’s protocol is a communication protocol that allows an agent,
say Alice, to send one message (or more) protected by an expiration time. While
the recipient (Bob) shall be able to retrieve the message(s) before the expiration
time, this must become impossible after the time is reached. To do so, a trusted
third party is required to provide an ephemeral key Keph, i.e. a public encryption
key linked with an expiration time, that is used to encrypt the data sent to Bob.
Then, Bob must ask the ephemerizer for a decryption key that he will get only
if the expiration time is not reached yet. This ensures the expected ephemeral
property. Moreover, by using multiple encryptions with single-use symmetric keys,
the protocol also ensures that the message remains secret for anybody except Alice
and Bob, even if the ephemerizer is dishonest. The protocol is displayed in figure 1,
with KBob being Bob’s public key. Here, S is the (new) key protecting M that Bob
must acquire from the ephemerizer. S is sent to Bob, too, but protected by Bob’s
public key so that only he can get it, and protected by the ephemeral key Keph to
ensure that Bob don’t get it if the expiration time is reached. It is then protected
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KeyID, {J}Keph
{{{S}KBob}Keph}J
{{S}KBob}JUse S to extract M
Keph broadcasted already
EphemerizerBobAlice
{{{S}KBob}Keph}T,
{T}KBob,
HMAC(T,{{S}KBob}Keph}. Keph)
Keph,KeyID,{M}S, verifies the hmac
Fig. 1. Ephemerizer Scheme proposed by Radia Perlman (using triple encryption). T , S, and J are
symmetric keys generated during the protocol.
(again!) by Bob’s public key (through T for efficiency) to ensure that only Bob
can query the ephemerizer. This is the so-called triple encryption. Bob’s query to
the ephemerizer simply consists in Bob asking him to remove the protection of the
ephemeral key Keph.
The initial state of the protocol matches the expects: all public keys of agents
are known by everybody including the intruder, as well as Keph and KeyID (ID
of Keph), and the HMAC function; private keys are known by their owner only;
and other atoms (T , S, M and J) are generated during the execution.
Security properties
This protocol was designed to guarantee both the ephemeral property on M (i.e.
bob cannot obtain M after the expiration time), and the confidentiality of M (only
Alice and Bob can obtain M). According to the formal analysis of this protocol
that we performed with CL-Atse, these properties are always satisfied for at most
two sessions, and for all the 3-sessions scenarios that we could run. However, it
appears immediately that this protocol does not guaranty the integrity of M : the
intruder can impersonate Alice to send his own message to Bob. However, integrity
of M is a basic property that many users may need. Therefore, in this paper we
add the two following properties to the previous basic ones:
(i) Integrity of the message: it is impossible for an intruder to corrupt, change or
replace M during the transfer;
(ii) Integrity of the protocol run: it is impossible for an intruder to corrupt, change
or replace any of the temporary keys of the protocol, i.e.. T , S, J or Keph.
In order to guaranty the property 1 above, a user would certainly simply sign M
with Alice’s private key, assuming that Bob knows her public key already. While
this works for single sessions, this does not for multiple ones: if an agent plays Alice
twice, then the intruder can exchange the messages of the two sessions. Therefore,
one need to include either the official recipient’s name or a session ID of Alice in the
message transmitted. Adding one or the other depends on the required strength of
integrity. We consider two options:
- Option 1, weak integrity. A data like M or T is corrupted between a and b
playing Alice and Bob when b receives a value for M that has never been sent by
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a in any of the (multiple) sessions she plays with b. That is, we allow messages of
one session to reach an other session as long as the agents are the same. To ensure
this, we replace M by {M}inv(KAlice) .Bob, i.e. Alice’s signature on M joint with
Bob’s name.
- Option 2, strong integrity. Same as above, but a message is also corrupted if it
is accepted in an other session (no crossing). To ensure this, adding the recipient’s
name is not enough. Therefore, we replace M by {M}inv(KAlice) .SID, with SID
a public, unique, number (like a port number) identifying Alice’s session playing
with Bob. We assume that Bob (and the intruder!) knows SID from the start of
the protocol.
Note that the encryption with S, as well as the triple encryption over S, should
prevent any modification of SID or Bob’s name. While these modifications may
look obvious at first, and may even be performed in practice since it is only a
modification of M , we will see that it is in fact possible for the intruder to combine
multiple sessions in order to corrupt the message M .
3 Symbolic analysis with CL-Atse
An integrity attack on M .
During the analysis of this protocol with CL-Atse, many attacks were found on
the integrity of any of the internal data of this protocol (M , T , S, Keph). The most
complex ones showed integrity flaws of either S or T . However, since the central
data in this protocol is M only, we choose to present here a simple integrity attack
on M w.r.t. the simple protocol extension presented above, for the strong integrity.
The same attack also works for weak integrity. The scenario is the following, with
a, b, c three agents and i the intruder:
Alice Bob Ephemerizer
1st session : a (honest) ←→ i (dishonest) ←→ e (honest)
2nd session : a (honest) ←→ b (honest) ←→ e (honest)
We write Xn the object X in session n. First, the session 1 is run normally,
thus adding {M1}inv(KAlice) to the intruder’s knowledge. Then, the intruder can
simply impersonate a in session 2 using {M1}inv(KAlice) instead of {M2}inv(KAlice):
the Alice’s signature is the only thing that the intruder cannot create himself.
However, b cannot differentiate M1 from M2, so M1 is accepted and the integrity is
lost.
Patch n◦1 : signing M and Sid.
The previous attack occurs for the single reason that the official receiver of
M1 could reuse the signature for Alice on it in an other session of the protocol.
To prevent that, we can naturally include SID, or Bob’s name, in the signature:
{M,SID}inv(KAlice) instead of {M}inv(KAlice) .SID. While it may not be obvious
at first that we also need to protect SID or Bob’s name with the signature, this
modification guaranty the integrity of M in the ephemerizer’s protocol. However,
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here we also want to guaranty the integrity of the local keys, i.e. S, T , J and Keph.
Hopelessly, the signature on M is unable to prevent the intruder from modifying or
replacing any of these local variables: there exist many attacks on the integrity of
these keys, including very complex ones.
Patch n◦2: signing S and Sid.
The problem of guarantying the integrity of all M , S, T , J and Keph here is
that we just cannot sign everything. For example, the analysis shows that our goal
would be reached if we could sign M , T and J (the key generated by Bob), and
that omitting to sign at even one of these objects allows the intruder to perform an
attack. But, in practice it would not be affordable to add more than one signature.
Moreover, signing only the HMAC could look like a good idea, since it contains data
that depend on S, T , and Keph. But still, some attacks remain. In fact, it appears
that the only way to guaranty the integrity of all local keys (plus M) is to sign S
directly (along with Sid): this is actually the central key of all the transmission,
and signing it prevents any modification on M (since S encrypts M), on T (since
nobody except Bob can retrieve {{S}KBob}Keph which is encrypted with T ), and
on Keph (since T ’s integrity is guarantied). Therefore, the modification w.r.t the
original protocol is the following :
{{S}KBob .Sid}inv(KAlice) replaces {S}KBob everywhere
It is remarkable that the signature must be placed inside the triple encryption: if
placed outside, that is if Alice sends
{{
{{S}KBob}Keph
}
T
.Sid
}
inv(KAlice)
to reduce
encryption time, then an attack still exists on the integrity of M . Similarly, there
also exists an attack if Alice signs {{S}KBob}Keph only.
On the point of view of the encryption time, this is very interesting: we can keep
encrypting only the “small” message S with KBob (slow, asymmetric encryption),
while we must encrypt {S}KBob and the signature with only KEph, T and J (fast,
symmetric encryption). Moreover, this may even be faster than signing M , since
{S}KBob is probably much smaller and faster to sign than M .
Successful analysis
For all analyzed scenario, no attacks were found on the ephemerizer’s protocol
with the signature on {S}KBob described above, for all the properties described in
this paper (including secrecy of M and integrity of M ,S, T , Keph and J), and for
any of the weak or strong integrity properties (with Bob’s name or Sid respectively).
Alternatively, signing S directly gives the same result. Also, signing M with the
correction of patch n◦1 still guaranty the integrity of M (alone). For all variants of
this protocol, we analyzed as many execution scenarios as we could, including all
relevant scenarios where honest agents plays at most two roles (that is, scenarios
that are not trivially secured), plus some scenarios with three or four roles per
honest agent. This is actually the limit of the analysis tool for this protocol: with
more sessions, no answer comes in a reasonable time. While it may be interesting
to use parallel computing to raise this limit, we think that the analyzed scenarios
are the most relevant ones for this protocol.
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4 Conclusion
In this short paper, we presented an analysis of the ephemerizer’s protocol by Radia
Perlman with CL-Atse and the AVISPA’s tool-suite. The analysis has tree main
results: first, it confirmed that the original protocol is secured against the ephemeral
property and the secrecy of M (even if the ephemerizer is dishonest); second, to
reach the integrity of M (the transmitted data), it showed that we cannot count on
the encryption by S to prevent modifications of M : at least the patch n◦1 is required;
and third, it showed that while signing M is a partial solution for a non-modifiable
implementation of the ephemerizer’s protocol, it is in fact much better, and more
secured, to sign S or {S}KBob instead (patch n
◦2): it is faster for large M , and it
guaranty that no run of this protocol can deviate from the specification (meaning
integrity of the protocol execution). For future work, it would be interesting to have
a security proof for the second extension of this protocol for an unbounded number
of sessions, either manually create, or automatically generated by an automatic tool
in a restricted model of protocol, like TA4SP [2], if it fits.
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